We Plant The Trees, They Cut Them Down: Challenges and Promise in Post-Assad Syria

In April 2025, Human Rights First (HRF) travelled to northeastern Syria to meet with human rights defenders as the country goes through a massive transition following the December 2024 overthrow of the Assad government by a militant group known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).  The people HRF interviewed expressed joy at the government’s demise and voiced hope that Syria might become an inclusive and stable country.

In this vein, some saw promising signs in certain developments since the fall of the Assad government.  For example, the new Syrian Transitional Government (STG) has reached agreements with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which operate in the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.  These agreements relate to security issues and the protection of Kurdish rights that had never been recognized by the Assad government.  Others HRF interviewed noted that a newly promulgated interim constitution speaks – at least in broad strokes – about protecting the rights of all Syrians.

Those positive indications aside, the people HRF spoke to expressed alarm at some events that have transpired in recent months and discussed their anxieties about what the future will actually hold for Syria.  More precisely, they expressed apprehension as to whether groups that do not share the religious orientation that has been espoused by top STG officials will be able to participate safely in Syrian society.  Many noted that the most critical positions in the government are held by people who have advocated a severe form of Islam.  An oft-cited example is that the first minister of justice appointed after the Assad government’s collapse can be seen in a video from several years ago, presiding over the execution of two women on a street in Idlib, Syria after he found them guilty of prostitution and corruption.

Others HRF talked with delineated what they see as telling deficiencies in the constitution promulgated by the STG that is to be in effect for a five-year “transitional” period.  For example, the constitution gives the president extensive control over not only the executive, but also the legislative and judicial branches of government.  It was noted further that the constitution requires the Syrian president to be a Muslim – but not actually Syrian.  It was observed that many non-Muslim Syrian citizens born and raised in Syria are barred from the presidency by that provision, while numerous foreign fighters in Syria who are Muslim could hold the office.  This was seen by many as an indication that the STG is not intent on creating a truly pluralistic Syria. The constitution also states that “Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.”  People with whom HRF spoke said that this raised questions about the roles that women and non-Muslims might be allowed to play in Syria.

The individuals HRF met with were even more anxious about human rights abuses committed in Syria following the fall of Assad.  Most prominent among these abuses are the killings by extremist Muslim fighters (who may have come from STG-aligned militias more than STG forces) of hundreds of people in Syria’s coastal areas in March 2025.  The primary victims of these killings were Alawites, who seemingly were targeted for revenge. Many Alawites have fled Syria since the massacres began.  HRF secured testimonies of such people in Lebanon, most of whom stated that they have no intention of returning, absent dramatic changes in Syria.

There also were violent attacks on Syria’s Druze community beginning in April 2025. These attacks, evidently by extremist Muslim militants, started after a Druze cleric was falsely accused of insulting the Prophet Mohammed.  Before Druze fighters and government forces restored order, over 100 people had been killed.  HRF uncovered other episodes of abuse directed at the Druze community including an instance in which police arrested and assaulted a group of Druze who were driving to a civil society conference in Raqqa.

The question of whether women will be allowed to participate fully in Syrian society was raised by many of those HRF interviewed.  The head of the STG’s “Women’s Affairs Office” has pronounced that, due to their fundamental nature, women “should take care of themselves, take care of their families, and take care of their husbands.”  The constitution’s provisions requiring that sharia be the basis for Syrian law are seen also as indicating STG officials do not value gender equity.  In that regard, there are reports from Homs that women who have long served as judges may not be allowed to continue in those positions (similar questions exist in relation to Christian judges).  Women in other workplaces have described new practices to segregate them from male colleagues.  Several interviewees observed that it would be perverse if women are forced into subservient roles in a future Syria, given the prominence of women in the anti-Assad revolution.

Another very substantial issue relates to internally displaced people.  Tens of thousands of Syrians are presently seeking refuge in northeast Syria, having been expelled from Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ayn in Arabic), and the al-Shahbah area near Aleppo by military campaigns at the hands of Turkiye and allied Syrian militias (the Syrian National Army or SNA). Those campaigns took place, respectively, in 2018, 2019, and late 2024 to early 2025, and involved well-documented human rights violations.  HRF visited a camp housing some of these internally displaced people who reported, uniformly, that despite living in squalid conditions and being desperate to return to their homes – which are not far geographically – the continued occupation of those areas by Turkish forces and the SNA made returning too risky.  Nothing other than the withdrawal of Turkish forces and cessation of SNA operations would allow these displaced people to go home.  (Although not relevant to the issue of displaced people in the north, people we spoke to also complained about Israeli forces occupying areas in the south and bombing around Syria).

Finally, the defenders with whom HRF spoke consistently emphasized Syria’s critical need for transitional justice in relation to the grave crimes that have been committed since 2011 by perpetrators on behalf of the Assad government, HTS, the SNA, and other parties to the various conflicts in Syria.  The terms of the constitution and the mandate of a transitional justice commission announced by the STG show that the STG intends to try only former members of the Assad government.  Those with whom HRF spoke said that such a circumscribed approach is not appropriate, given the range of groups that have violated international law over the past fourteen years in Syria.  Beyond that, HRF spoke to many people who observed that there is a need to establish an independent Syrian court system that has the requisite capacity to address crimes under international law, which will likely require international support.

In sum, the collapse of the Assad government that ran Syria since the early 1970s presents an extraordinary opportunity for the country to remake itself.  The challenges in this regard can hardly be overstated, considering – among other things – Syria’s precarious financial position, the hardening of certain factional divisions over recent years, and the fact that past Syrian governments have provided no models to emulate.  We submit that the views of the people we spoke to warrant serious consideration in this context.